Free Will Is Undefeated
Determinists like Sam Harris look for ways to excuse bad behavior.
A fashionable view of human behavior holds that because everything has a cause, no one is truly responsible for their actions.
In his 2023 bestseller “Determined,” Stanford neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues that free will is an illusion. “We are nothing more or less than the cumulative biological and environmental luck, over which we had no control, that has brought us to any moment,” he writes. Author and podcaster Sam Harris has spent 15 years making the same case to a popular audience. “Our wills are simply not of our own making,” he writes in “Free Will” (2012). “Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.”
Common sense pushes back. Consider an example from the psychologist Paul Bloom. Imagine a man who thrashes violently in his sleep and accidentally strikes his wife, breaking her nose. They both wake up, and he is horrified and ashamed. Now imagine a second man who resents his wife and wants to hurt her. He waits until she is asleep then hits her in the face. When she wakes up, he pretends it was an accident. The difference between these two men is obvious. Any legal or moral system that doesn’t recognize that would collapse.
Yet much of elite discourse encourages us to blur that distinction. Determinists like Messrs. Sapolsky and Harris tell us that behavior can be explained through systems, incentives, trauma, inequality, neurochemistry and social pressure. Much of this is true. But a culture that speaks only this language teaches people that they are spectators in their own lives. The implication, rarely stated outright, is that no one really chooses anything. We are all the first man in the example above, thrashing in our sleep.
The determinists don’t deny that we have wills, or that our actions follow from them. Their argument is that will and action are themselves the products of deeper causes, such as genes, molecules and the environment, and so we can’t really be called free.
Stuart Doyle offers a useful analogy that challenges this claim. Suppose we ask whether an apple is red. The determinist looks closer. He realizes the apple is nothing but atoms. Because no individual atom is red, he concludes the apple can’t really be red. The error is obvious. Color exists at the scale of the apple, not at the scale of an atom.
Free will works the same way. A choice exists at the scale of a person thinking, weighing and deciding. Looking at the molecules underneath and finding no choice there doesn’t prove that choice is an illusion.
The psychologist Roy F. Baumeister has spent much of his career arguing against this type of thinking. In his recent book, “The Science of Free Will,” he claims that free will evolved because it was required to live in complex social systems. Culture works only if people can restrain themselves. They must follow rules when no one is watching. They must delay gratification. They must make plans. They must explain themselves. They must know that actions today bring consequences tomorrow.
Mr. Baumeister’s key move is to treat free will as a matter of degree. Some actions are freer than others. A man ordering dinner from a menu is freer than a man being robbed at gunpoint. A sober adult planning his career is freer than a drunk teenager in a parking lot at 2 a.m.
Mr. Baumeister is fond of the phrase “responsible autonomy.” A child lacks the capacity for it. So does a person in the grip of addiction, rage or delusion. A functioning adult is expected to have it. This is why we praise self-control and blame cruelty. It is why courts distinguish among accident, negligence and murder. It is why “I couldn’t help it” is sometimes an explanation and sometimes an excuse.
The determinists would have us drop these distinctions. But notice the asymmetry in their position. They rarely treat themselves as automatons. They also reserve agency for the educated reader, who is presumed to have the ability to redesign legal systems and reimagine institutions. Free will for me, but not for thee.
The deniers of free will haven’t improved society. They have merely produced a more forgiving vocabulary for those who damage it. The man who waits for his wife to fall asleep becomes harder to condemn, because somewhere in his past there is a reason. There is always a reason, but that isn’t the same as an excuse or justification.
Mr. Henderson is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and the author of “Troubled: A Memoir of Foster Care, Family, and Social Class.”





As a physics PhD, I had to admit that Sapolsky's argument in Determined is airtight. As a human being, I agree with his own comment that Determined is a "dangerous book". If we really took "there is no free will" to heart, our motivation and morality would be completely undercut. Selectively and superficially applying this belief might arguably have some cultural benefits, but that is like cherry-picking data to make your case -- dangerous even if you're on the side of the angels.
For me, his conclusion highlights the limits of science itself. At the same time, scientific inquiry can help us construct robust value systems aligned with and respectful of human nature, even if these values ultimately rest on faith that we individually have something like free will, despite Sapolsky's counterargument. I would be more comfortable with research into the evolutionary basis of social systems than with erudite applications of determinism to law and social justice.
As far as I can tell you are just performing a semantic pivot by saying that a 'will' that is derived of cognitive processes that the individual cannot control or even be aware of is 'free will'. We all agree that personal moral responsibility is a necessary element of any functioning society, but it doesn't follow 'free will' is therefore cognitively feasible.